Uncertainty quantification is an important task in machine learning - a task in which standardneural networks (NNs) have traditionally not excelled. This can be a limitation for safety-critical applications, where uncertainty-aware methods like Gaussian processes or Bayesian linear regression are often preferred. Bayesian neural networks are an approach to address this limitation. They assume probability distributions for all parameters and yield distributed predictions. However, training and inference are typically intractable and approximations must be employed. A promising approximation is NNs with Bayesian last layer (BLL). They assume distributed weights only in the linear output layer and yield a normally distributed prediction. To approximate the intractable Bayesian neural network, point estimates of the distributed weights in all but the last layer should be obtained by maximizing the marginal likelihood. This has previously been challenging, as the marginal likelihood is expensive to evaluate in this setting. We present a reformulation of the log-marginal likelihood of a NN with BLL which allows for efficient training using backpropagation. Furthermore, we address the challenge of uncertainty quantification for extrapolation points. We provide a metric to quantify the degree of extrapolation and derive a method to improve the uncertainty quantification for these points. Our methods are derived for the multivariate case and demonstrated in a simulation study. In comparison to Bayesian linear regression with fixed features, and a Bayesian neural network trained with variational inference, our proposed method achieves the highest log-predictive density on test data.

Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience of the network users. We focus on Bayesian games with atomic players, where network vagaries are modeled via a (random) state of nature which determines the costs incurred by the players. A third-party entity---the sender---can observe the realized state of the network and exploit this additional information to send a signal to each player. A natural question is the following: is it possible for an informed sender to reduce the overall social cost via the strategic provision of information to players who update their beliefs rationally? The paper focuses on the problem of computing optimal ex ante persuasive signaling schemes, showing that symmetry is a crucial property for its solution. Indeed, we show that an optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme can be computed in polynomial time when players are symmetric and have affine cost functions. Moreover, the problem becomes NP-hard when players are asymmetric, even in non-Bayesian settings.